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Abstract
Using new scaling methods and a comprehensive public opinion dataset, we develop the
first survey-based time-series–cross-sectional measures of policy ideology in European
mass publics. Our dataset covers 27 countries and 36 years and contains nearly 2.7 mil-
lion survey responses to 109 unique issue questions. Estimating an ordinal group-level
IRT model in each of four issue domains, we obtain biennial estimates of the abso-
lute economic conservatism, relative economic conservatism, social conservatism, and
immigration conservatism of men and women in three age categories in each country.
Aggregating the group-level estimates yields estimates of the average conservatism in
national publics in each biennium between 1981–82 and 2015–16. The four measures
exhibit contrasting cross-sectional cleavages and distinct temporal dynamics, illustrat-
ing the multidimensionality of mass ideology in Europe. Subjecting our measures to
a series of validation tests, we show that the constructs they measure are distinct
and substantively important, and that they perform as well as or better than one-
dimensional proxies for mass conservatism (left–right self-placement and median-voter
scores). We foresee many uses for these scores by scholars of public opinion, electoral
behavior, representation, and policy feedback.
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Introduction
How do citizens’ policy preferences vary across countries? How do they differ across issue
domains? How have they changed over time? What are the sources of these ideological
differences? How do mass preferences affect electoral and policy outcomes? Which political
institutions inhibit or enhance government responsiveness to citizens’ preferences? Such
questions lie at the heart of the field of European politics and of political science generally.
To study them, scholars require measures of mass policy preferences that can be compared
across countries and over time. Despite decades of cross-national survey research in Europe,
however, measures that meet these standards remain elusive.
The key barrier to cross-national measures is a lack of survey questions repeated consis-
tently across years and European countries. As a consequence, cross-national research on
representation and related topics in European politics has relied instead on indirect proxies
for mass policy preferences. By far the most common of these proxies are, first, the av-
erage citizen’s self-placement on a left–right scale (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Huber
1989) and, second, the left–right location of the median voter as inferred from the ideolog-
ical scores of party manifestos (Kim and Fording 1998; De Neve 2011). The development
of these measures was an understandable response to the limitations of existing data and
statistical methods, and many excellent and influential studies of the role of mass ideology
in European politics would hardly have been possible without them. With these measures,
scholars have examined such central issues as governments’ ideological congruence with the
mass public (Huber and Powell 1994; Schmitt and Thomassen 1997; McDonald and Budge
2005; Mayne and Hakhverdian 2017), their responsiveness to ideological shifts in popular
preferences (Adams et al. 2004, 2006; Ezrow et al. 2010), and how these relationships are
influenced by electoral rules and institutions (Powell 2000; Blais and Bodet 2006; Powell
2009; Golder and Stramski 2010; Ferland 2016).
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But as even many scholars that use them admit, these proxies are not ideal measures of
citizens’ policy preferences per se. Left–right self-placement can depend greatly on political
context, imperiling comparison across countries and time, and like other measures of ide-
ological identification is often driven as much by partisan and symbolic attachments as by
“operational” policy preferences (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Thorisdottir et al. 2007;
see also Ellis and Stimson 2012). For their part, median-voter scores hinge on assumptions
about party manifesto scores’ comparability across countries and the primacy of left–right
ideology in determining voters’ partisan choices (Kim and Fording 1998, 76–7), thus begging
some of the very questions that we wish to answer. Moreover, both of these proxies pre-
sume that ideological variation in Europe takes place along a single left–right dimension, an
assumption that, however plausible in earlier eras, is called into question by the increasing
salience of political conflict over non-economic issues (Inglehart 1990; Kitschelt 1994; Knut-
sen 1995; Kriesi et al. 2006). There is, in short, a clear need for summary measures of mass
ideology that are derived directly from citizens’ policy preferences, can be compared across
time and countries, and reflect the multidimensional character of European politics.
This article introduces measures of mass ideology in European publics designed to meet
this need. Taking advantage of recent advances in ideological scaling methods, we esti-
mate the domain-specific policy conservatism of men and women in three age categories and
twenty-seven European countries in each biennium between 1981–82 and 2015–16. Specif-
ically, we estimate an ordinal variant of Caughey and Warshaw’s (2015) dynamic group-
level item response theory (DGIRT) model on a comprehensive dataset of multi-country
public opinion surveys, distinguishing among economic, social/postmaterial, and immigra-
tion/nationalism issues. For economic issues, we further distinguish between policy “mood,”
which captures citizens’ preferences for less government activity relative to current policy
(Stimson 1991), and “absolute” conservatism, which does not depend explicitly on the pol-
icy status quo. Because the DGIRT model estimates conservatism at the level of population
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groups rather than individuals, it surmounts the problem of sparse and uneven question
availability that has until now stymied the creation of time-series–cross-national (TSCS)
measures of policy ideology in Europe. This allows us to paint a rich new portrait of the
conservatism of European mass publics across multiple issue domains.
Although most of our findings are consistent with previous survey research on issue-
specific attitudes, many diverge sharply from the ideological patterns implied by self-placement
or median-voter scores. According to our estimates, the European public has become more
economically conservative in absolute terms since the 1980s, but its economic mood—that
is, its conservatism relative to the policy status quo—has shifted leftward. Europeans have
also become somewhat less conservative on immigration and much less so on social issues.
Cross-sectionally, we find that men have always been substantially more conservative than
women on economic issues, but not on immigration or (until recently) social issues. On
social and immigration issues, conservatism increases markedly with age. On economics, age
differences are more muted, but Europeans older than 60 tend to be less conservative than
their younger counterparts.
All four measures exhibit a rich–poor gradient across countries that generally divides
countries in Northern Europe from those in the South and East. On social and immigration
issues, Northern Europeans are the most progressive and Southern and Eastern Europeans
are the most conservative. On economic issues, the gradient is reversed. Most Northern
publics are more economically right-wing, especially in terms of mood. By contrast, South-
ern Europe and most of Eastern Europe, with the exception of a few wealthier countries, tend
to be very left-wing on economics. Across countries, economic mood thus has a strong neg-
ative association with social and immigration conservatism (which are positively correlated
with each other), whereas absolute economic conservatism covaries with economic mood but
is essentially uncorrelated with social and immigration conservatism. These patterns indi-
cate that a single left–right dimension cannot capture cross-national ideological variation in
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Europe. In line with this, we find that self-placement and median-voter scores are at best
weakly associated with policy conservatism in any domain (as well as with each other).
To demonstrate the validity of our measures of policy conservatism, we show that they
have a strong cross-sectional correlation with responses to highly ideological survey ques-
tions in their respective domains. Our conservatism scores also faithfully reflect longitudinal
trends in mass conservatism as estimated by Stimson’s (1991) Dyad Ratios algorithm. In ad-
dition, we evaluate the relationship between our mass ideological measures and government
policies. Cross-sectionally, mass-level social progressivism strongly predicts the strength of
countries’ gay rights policies, and progressivism on immigration does so on pro-immigrant
policies. Moreover, within-country, variation in economic mood predicts variation in welfare
generosity. Notably, our conservatism scores are more highly correlated with each of these
policy outcomes than are self-placement and median-voter scores. We also show that mass
economic conservatism predicts voting behavior. Overall, we conclude that the ideological
constructs measured by our mass conservatism scores are both substantively important and
fundamentally distinct from those measured by self-placement and median-voter scores.
Policy Ideology in European Mass Publics
The correspondence between citizens’ preferences and government policies lies at the core of
normative justifications for democracy, if not its very definition, and is thus a central concern
of comparative politics (Dahl 1989; for an empirical review, see Powell 2004). Scholars of
European politics, site of many of the world’s longest-standing democracies, have accordingly
developed a rich literature on the content and structure of mass policy preferences.
Citizens’ specific attitudes are typically presumed to be structured along one or more
ideological dimensions, rooted in divergent interests and values. The cleavage over the dis-
tribution of economic resources has always played a central role in structuring ideological
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conflict and party competition in Europe. Since the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan
(1967), however, the literature on parties and mass behavior has recognized “the importance
of alternative, ‘second’ dimensions of political conflict” over religion and other cultural issues
(Häusermann and Kriesi 2015, 202). These two main ideological dimensions, typically la-
beled economic and cultural, have survived or even been reinforced by the rise of new issues
such as environmentalism and gay rights, with their content evolving over time as new issues
arise (e.g., Inglehart 1984; Kitschelt 1994). One possible exception to this pattern is the
recent emergence of issues of national identity, particularly as related to immigration, which
some scholars argue has now become a distinct third dimension of political conflict (Heath
et al. 1999; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014; but see Kriesi et al. 2006).
The content and relative importance of these ideological dimensions has varied across
time and countries. As Inglehart (1990) argues, the increasing salience of “postmaterialist”
concerns has been tied to rising levels of wealth. Younger generations, socialized in more
affluent circumstances, have placed greater emphasis on postmaterialist values and have
tended to be more left-libertarian than their forebears (Inglehart 1985; Kriesi 1998, 174–
6). Moreover, postmaterialism has emerged at different rates across countries depending
on their level of economic development. For this and other reasons, scholars have found
substantial ideological variation in issue attitudes across European publics, with much of the
cross-national variation falling along north–southeast, rich–poor lines.
On economic issues, the publics of Southern and Eastern European countries have gen-
erally been found to be more left-wing than their Northern European counterparts. Bonoli
(2000), for example, shows that Southern Europe, along with France, stands out as particu-
larly supportive of government intervention in the economy. Similarly, Papadakis and Bean
(1993) and Kenworthy and McCall (2008) find Italians to be more supportive of economic
redistribution than Northern European publics. Renwick and Tóka (1998), Lipsmeyer and
Nordstrom (2003), and Dallinger (2010) find that, with the possible exception of the Czech
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Republic, Eastern European countries are more left-wing on government spending and other
economic issues than countries in Western Europe. Paradoxically, there is at best mixed
evidence that the generosity of welfare states is positively correlated with mass support for
economic redistribution, government provision of social benefits, or related issue positions
(Jaeger 2006). In particular, Scandinavians, despite enjoying arguably the most generous
welfare states in the world, express less support for redistributive policies than Germans,
Austrians, and other Central Europeans (Jaeger 2009).
The cross-national patterns uncovered by research on cultural and postmaterial issues
tend to be the opposite of the patterns on economic issues. Generally speaking, studies of
these issues have found that Northern European countries are the most socially progressive,
while Southern and Eastern European countries are the most conservative. On gender issues,
for example, a small set of countries have highly egalitarian views: the Scandinavian countries
plus the Netherlands. Southern and Eastern European countries are the most traditional,
with other countries in the middle (Renwick and Tóka 1998; Treas and Widmer 2000; Sjöberg
2004). Likewise, studies of support for gay rights find a clear north–south and east–west
income gradient across countries. Most European countries saw big rises in support for
gay rights over the period we examine, with the Scandinavian countries (excluding Finland)
and the Netherlands showing the biggest rises. By contrast, aside from Spain, Southern
and Eastern European countries did not see substantial rises in support and remain quite
opposed to homosexuality (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Akker, Ploeg, and Scheepers 2013;
Pew Research Center 2017). Environmental issues exhibit similar cross-national patterns
(Inglehart 1995; Franzen and Vogl 2013).
As noted above, some scholars have advocated treating immigration and related issues
of national identity as a distinct ideological dimension. Multi-nation survey research of
immigration has been comparatively rare, but what work exists finds cross-country patterns
similar to those on social issues. Austria, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Portugal stand
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out as relatively conservative on immigration, and Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland as
relatively progressive (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2008; Meuleman, Davidov, and
Billiet 2009). While correlated with social/cultural attitudes in cross section, immigration
attitudes have not been found to share the social issues’ clear liberalizing trend over time.
In fact, different cross-national studies have documented a mix of increasing, decreasing,
and stable trends in anti-immigration attitudes since the late 1980s (Ceobanu and Escandell
2010, 312–3).
Previous Approaches to Summarizing Mass Ideology
Despite the wealth of cross-national opinion data that has accumulated over the past several
decades, scholars of European politics have faced substantial hurdles to summarizing general
ideological trends across time and countries. The problem, notes Dalton (2010, 105), is that
the “diversity of issues across elections and nations [makes it] difficult to systematically and
meaningfully compare” mass ideology across political contexts. To surmount these difficulties
with direct survey measures of mass issue attitudes, scholars of European politics have turned
to proxy measures intended to summarize mass ideology in ways that are comparable across
countries and over time. The two most important are citizens’ self-placement on a left–right
ideological scale and the ideological location of the median voter as inferred from election
results and party manifestos.
Self-Placement on a Left–Right Scale
Beginning with the European Community’s 1973 Eurobarometer survey, a large number of
cross-national surveys in Europe have included a question asking respondents to place their
political views on a ten-point left–right scale, making it the only question that has been asked
regularly and consistently across countries and over time. Since their introduction, left–right
self-placement scores have been used by numerous works to summarize ideological differences
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across countries and time (e.g., Huber 1989; Knutsen 1998) and to test substantive theories
of democratic politics (Huber and Powell 1994; Schmitt and Thomassen 1997; Adams et
al. 2004; Blais and Bodet 2006). From the beginning, however, scholars have expressed
skepticism towards “the classic view of the left–right dimension. . . as a super-issue which
summarizes the programmes of opposing groups,” arguing instead that citizens’ ideological
self-placement reflects partisan and other group identities, as well as symbolic associations,
at least as much as it does issue preferences (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, 244; see also
Huber 1989; Knutsen 1997).1
Self-placement scores have also been criticized for differential item functioning, as the
meaning of ideological labels can vary substantially across countries and even across indi-
viduals and social groups within the same country (Thorisdottir et al. 2007; Lo, Proksch,
and Gschwend 2014; Bauer et al. 2017).2 “Thus, to a German blue-collar worker,” writes
Dalton (2010, 105), “Left may still mean social welfare policies; to a young German college
student it may mean environmental protection and issues of multiculturalism.” If policy
preferences are multidimensional, this last fact is particularly problematic because it implies
that an individual’s self-placement can depend on which policy issues they associate with
those labels. In short, although left–right self-placement is the best single-question indicator
of mass ideology, it is far from an ideal summary of citizen’s policy preferences.3
1Klingemann (1979) found that only a minority of European voters know what sorts of policies are associated
with the labels “left” and “right.”
2Several recent studies have used anchoring vignettes and other methods to address the problem of differential
item functioning across contexts (e.g., Lo, Proksch, and Gschwend 2014; Bakker et al. 2014). Unfortunately,
the survey questions required to use such techniques have not been regularly included on European surveys
and thus cannot be used to create measures that extend back more than a decade or so.
3Although survey questions on particular issues are not immune to the effects of partisan and symbolic
attachments, ideological identitification is likely to be more susceptible to such influences. Abstract concepts
such as “left” and “right” are more difficult for ordinary citizens to understand, increasing the likelihood
that they will rely on heuristics such as their affect towards the social groups they associate with each label.
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Inferred Median-Voter Locations
In response to the perceived inadequacies of self-placement scores, Kim and Fording (1998)
developed an alternative measure of voter ideology: the median voter’s inferred position on
a left–right scale (see also De Neve 2011). This measure is premised on a spatial model of
elections in which the only systematic determinant of vote choice is voters’ proximity to par-
ties on a left–right ideological dimension. Under this model, the location of the median voter
can be inferred from the distribution of vote share across parties with different ideological
positions, which Kim and Fording (1998) measure using the Comparative Manifesto Project
(CMP) ideological ratings of party platforms (Budge et al. 2001). Assuming that this uni-
dimensional spatial model holds and that the coding of party positions is comparable across
countries and over time, median-voter scores are valid measures of mass policy preferences.
Median-voter scores’ calculability in years and countries without survey data make them
particularly powerful measures, and they have been used by a large number of substantive
studies (e.g., Stevenson 2001; McDonald and Budge 2005; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009;
Kim, Powell, and Fording 2010; Pontusson and Rueda 2010).
Notwithstanding their usefulness, median-voter scores have been subject to a number
of criticisms (for a compelling summary, see Warwick and Zakharova 2012). Some of these
criticisms stem from problems with the CMP codings that underlie the median-voter scores
(Curini 2010; Mikhaylov, Laver, and Benoit 2012). But even granting the validity of the
CMP measure of party positions, the spatial-voting assumptions required to infer the location
of the median voter from party vote shares are arguably quite strong because they rule out
any systematic influences on vote choice aside from ideology. More to the point, insofar as
median-voter scores are used to evaluate mass–elite linkages, these assumptions risk begging
the question by presuming what they seek to demonstrate.
Finally, both median-voter and self-placement scores share the assumption that European
politics takes place along a single left–right dimension. Whether or not this assumption is
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reasonable for elite politics (for evidence against, see Warwick 2002), it runs counter to the
large literature reviewed earlier that emphasizes the multidimensionality of societal cleavages
and mass policy preferences. Given that the issue-specific evidence suggests that many coun-
tries are left-wing on some issues but right-wing on others, the inadequacy of the assumption
of unidimensionality is particularly glaring if the goal is cross-national comparison.
Inferring Ideology from Issue Preferences
The limitations of self-placement and median-voter scores are widely recognized, and even
works that employ them sometimes admit that a direct survey-based measure of mass policy
ideology would be preferable. Several recent reviews have called for more attention to and
better measures of (multidimensional) issue preferences in the mass public (Powell 2004,
290–1; Evans 2010, 636–7; Franklin 2010, 654). At present, however, self-placement and
median-voter scores are pretty much the only available options for scholars who require a
time-varying, cross-national measure of mass ideology. Stevenson (2001, 623–4), for example,
laments that while scholars of U.S. politics have measured mass ideology by “combining in-
formation from thousands of different survey questions,” in other democracies “the available
survey data on the policy opinions of citizens . . . are not nearly as comprehensive . . . , ren-
dering similar measurements for these countries impossible” and requiring the use of proxy
measures instead. The crux of the problem, as Kim and Fording (1998, 75) put it, is the lack
of “enough identical questions. . . across enough countries to provide a reasonable basis for a
survey-based measure of ideology.” Though survey-based time-series of mass policy ideology
have been constructed for single countries (Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda, and Stimson 2011;
Stimson, Thiébaut, and Tiberj 2012; McGann 2014), to date there has been no equivalent
measure available for TSCS analyses across multiple countries.
In the following sections, we describe a strategy for measuring mass ideology that over-
comes the problem of sparse survey data and yields dynamic, cross-national, domain-specific
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measures of mass policy ideology across European countries. Our approach shares elements
in common with both existing methods. Like self-placement scores, our measures are based
on self-reported assessments of political preferences. Like the median-voter approach, how-
ever, we do not measure mass ideology directly, but rather treat it as a latent trait whose
distribution can be inferred from aggregate data on citizens’ political preferences. Unlike
prior approaches, we do not assume a priori that mass ideology is unidimensional, but rather
allow it to differ across issue domains. Generating these measures requires both a great deal
of survey data and a measurement model linking the data to latent policy ideology. Below,
we describe each of these in turn.
Survey Data and Issue Domains
We constructed a comprehensive dataset containing all multi-year cross-national surveys
conducted in Europe between 1981 and 2016. These include the European Social Survey
(ESS), various modules of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the European
Values Survey (EVS), the Pew Global Attitudes Survey, and some special editions of the
Eurobarometer. Almost all Western and Southern European countries and 9 countries from
the former Eastern Bloc appear in the data, for a total of 27 nations in all.4 For most of
Western Europe, the dataset begins in 1981 with the first cross-national surveys with usable
issue questions, but many countries, including Greece, Cyprus, and most of Eastern Europe,
do not appear in the data until the end of the 1980s. Every survey question in the dataset
concerns domestic policy issues and was asked with identical wording across multiple years
and countries.
In light of the debates over the dimensionality of Europeans’ issue preferences, we sorted
questions into three substantive domains: economic, social, and immigration. The economic
4The dataset omits a few European countries, such as Luxembourg, Malta, Croatia, and Serbia, that have
been surveyed too infrequently for reliable inference.
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domain captures the classic left–right divide over the size and scope of government and its role
in mitigating inequality. The social domain comprises postmaterial and cultural issues such
as gender equality, abortion, gay rights, environmental protection, and libertarianism versus
authoritarianism.5 The immigration domain encompasses questions related to nationalism
and national identity as well as those pertaining to immigration specifically.
Within the economic domain, we further distinguish between questions that ask about
policy values or outcomes directly and those that ask about the direction of change relative
to current policy.6 We refer to questions in the first category as absolute and those in the
second as relative. This second category roughly corresponds to James Stimson’s concept of
public policy mood—the public’s desire for the government to “do more or less, spend more
or less, and tax more or less” (Stimson 2012, 25). Because relative preferences depend on
the policy status quo, two individuals from countries with different policies may well differ
in their relative preferences even if they share the same absolute preferences. Lipsmeyer
and Nordstrom (2003, 340), for example, report that Eastern and Western Europeans do
not differ on average in their opinions regarding the scope of state responsibility for the
needy, but support for increases in state welfare spending is nevertheless significantly higher
in Eastern Europe. In short, there are both conceptual and empirical reasons to measure
absolute and relative economic conservatism separately from one another.
We thus created four separate datasets with non-overlapping question sets: absolute
economic, relative economic, social, and immigration. As Table 1 indicates, each dataset
contains at least 17 survey questions and half a million unique respondents. The absolute
economic and social datasets extend back to 1981 while the relative economic and immi-
5Although environmental issues are often considered part of a second, “postmaterial” dimension (Inglehart
1995), not all authors agree (e.g., Kriesi et al. 2006). To check whether their inclusion drives our results, we
re-estimated our models without environmental issues in the social scale and found that our results were
virtually identical (see Supplementary Information (SI), Section 3). Section 2 of the SI also shows that the
environmental items are in fact positively correlated with the other social issues items.
6We do not make the same distinction for social and immigration questions because relative questions are
much less common in those domains, and none are included in our scales.
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Dataset # Respondents # Questions Year Range
absolute economic 801,725 37 1981–2016
relative economic 616,674 17 1985–2016
social 691,549 34 1981–2016
immigration 551,425 21 1990–2016
Table 1: Summary statistics
gration data begin in 1985 and 1990, respectively.7 By estimating our measurement model
separately on each dataset, we produce four distinct measures of mass conservatism.
We emphasize that our categorization of questions was based on ex ante substantive
judgement and not on statistical criteria for selecting the “correct” number of latent dimen-
sions, making it analogous to confirmatory rather than exploratory factor analysis. As we
report in the SI (Figure S7), however, we find that nearly all questions in the same dataset
are positively correlated, and there is a clear drop-off in explanatory power between the first
principal component and higher-order ones. We therefore consider it reasonable to summa-
rize the variation in each dataset with a single latent trait. We recognize, however, that
other scholars might make different choices, and to facilitate this we are making our full
code available online, together with instructions for how survey questions could be combined
differently to produce estimates for other domains or for different numbers of dimensions.
Illustrative Survey Questions
To illustrate the patterns in our survey data, Figure 1 plots opinion trends on three sur-
vey items in each domain (absolute economic, relative economic, social, and immigration).
Results are shown for four countries—Hungary, Italy, Norway, and Great Britain—from dif-
ferent parts of Europe. As this figure makes clear, ideological differences across countries
7As Figures S1 and S2 in the SI show, each question is repeated rarely and unevenly across time, but together
the survey data provide coverage of a large majority of country-years since 1981. The SI also provides full
information on the sources, wording, and response scales of each question.
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differ substantially depending on the issue domain.
The top row of Figure 1 plots trends on three questions that tap into absolute economic
preferences: whether the government should be responsible mitigating income inequality, tax
the rich at a higher rate than the poor, and be responsible for providing for the unemployed.
The relative positioning of the countries differs somewhat depending on the question. Great
Britain is usually the most conservative country on all three questions, especially since 2000,
whereas Italy and Hungary tend to be further left. Norway, by contrast, is relatively con-
servative on income inequality and progressive taxation, but the most leftwing on providing
for the unemployed. In general, Hungary and Italy drifted leftward between the 1990s and
2000s, whereas Norway and Great Britain remained stable or became more conservative.
The overall pattern, however, is that opinions on absolute economic issues have remained
fairly consistent over time.
Opinion change tends to be larger on questions concerning change relative to the status
quo (second row). This makes sense, since relative preferences are a function both of absolute
preferences and of current conditions. For example, the British public’s position on whether
income differences are too large and taxes on the rich too high (second row, first and second
columns) shifted sharply rightward between the early and late 1990s, despite little change
in the British public’s general opposition to government responsibility for inequality and
progressive taxation (top row, first and second columns). Hungary exhibited an even more
striking leftward shift on these relative questions between the communist-era 1980s and the
2000s. The influence of the status quo may also explain why Norwegians are consistently
leftwing on responsibility for the unemployed (first row, third column) but rightwing on
whether to spend more on the unemployed (second row, third column), for even someone
who leans left relative to most Europeans might nevertheless regard Norway’s unusually
expansive welfare state as overly generous.
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Figure 1: Opinion trends on illustrative survey questions for four countries. The horizontal
axis indicates the proportion of respondents in the country who were more conservative than
average on that question.
site to those on economics. On both non-economic domains, Norwegians are clearly the most
progressive of the four publics, especially in recent years. On the other end of the ideological
spectrum, Hungarians express by far the greatest conservatism on immigration and (except
for abortion) social issues. Unlike the other three domains, social issues exhibit an overall
trend towards greater progressivism over time, particularly with regard to homosexuality.
On immigration, there is some evidence of countervailing opinion trends across countries.
Most strikingly, during the refugee crisis of the 2010s, support for banning immigrants from
poor countries jumped in Hungary and Italy but fell sharply in Great Britain and to a lesser
extent Norway.
As this analysis illustrates, the idiosyncratic variation on individual survey items and their
uneven availability across countries and time can make it difficult to discern common trends.
Nevertheless, suggestive patterns do emerge when we analyze questions within domains and
compare across them. In the next section, we describe a measurement strategy that enables
us to bring these patterns into clearer relief using data on many more questions and countries.
Measurement Model
Using survey responses to estimate citizens’ ideology requires a measurement model that
connects the (observed) data to the (unobserved) latent trait. Item response theory (IRT)
provides a convenient framework for this task. In an IRT model, subjects’ responses are
jointly determined by their score on the latent trait—in our case, their domain-specific
conservatism—and by the characteristics of the particular question. Because most survey
items in our dataset offer ordered response options (e.g., strongly agree, agree, neither agree
nor disagree, etc.), we employ an ordinal IRT model. In the probit version of this model,
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subject i’s probability of responding to question q with response option k ∈ 1 . . . Kq is
Pr(yiq = k | θi, βq,αq) = Φ(βqθi − αq,k−1)− Φ(βqθi − αq,k), (1)
where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function, θi is i’s domain-specific conservatism,
βq is the “discrimination” of item q with respect to that trait, and the Kq + 1 thresholds αq
are ordered as −∞ = αq,0 < αq,1 < . . . < αq,K−1 < αq,K =∞ (Fox 2010, 12–14).8
In a typical application, an individual-level IRT model would be used to estimate each
respondent’s conservatism based on his or her responses to multiple issue questions in a given
domain (e.g., Treier and Hillygus 2009). Unfortunately, because European surveys conducted
in different countries and time periods have included different survey questions, and each
respondent usually answers no more than a handful of questions, an individual-level approach
is not feasible in the European context. Our solution to this difficulty is to marginalize over
the distribution of conservatism across individuals and instead estimate average conservatism
in different segments of the public, using a group-level IRT model (Mislevy 1983). Although
our main focus in this application is cross-national comparison, we estimate conservatism at
a lower level of aggregation, in groups defined by the cross-classification of country, gender,
and age categories. In addition to being substantively interesting, these population groups
were chosen because they are measured in a standardized way across countries and surveys
and because their population proportions are available from census data, which means that
national conservatism can be estimated by weighting the group estimates to match their
distribution in the population.
The specific model we use is an ordinal variant of the Bayesian dynamic group-level
IRT model developed by Caughey and Warshaw (2015).9 In an ordinal DGIRT model, the
8In the case of Kq = 2 categories (“0” and “1”), the ordinal model reduces to the conventional binary IRT
model: Pr(yiq = 2 = “1”) = Φ(βqθi − αq,1)− Φ(βqθi −∞) = Φ(βqθi − αq).
9For an alternative implementation of an ordinal DGIRT model, see Vandeweerdt (2018). For other related
models, see McGann (2014), Berwick and Caughey (2018), and Claassen (2019).
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probability that in period t a randomly sampled member i of population group g selects
response option k to item q is










 = πtgqk, (2)
where θ̄gt is the average of θi in group g at time t and σ
2
θ is the variance of θi within groups.
The vector of probabilities πtgq = (πtgq1, . . . , πtgqKq) can then be linked to the data via a
multinominal sampling model,
stgq ∼ Multinomial(πtgq), (3)
where stgq = (stgq1, . . . , stgqKq) is the number of respondents in group g who in period t
selected category k in response to question q.
In each period, the prior distribution for θ̄gt is given by a local-level transition model,
θ̄gt ∼ N(θ̄g,t−1, σ2θ̄). In periods when data are sparse (or absent), this transition model
smooths (or imputes) estimates of θ̄gt based on the estimates for adjacent years. To identify
the polarity of the latent conservatism space, we restrict each βq to be positive (and recode
the survey data so that higher responses are more conservative). To identify its location
and scale, we normalize the θ̄tg to have zero mean and unit variance across groups and
time periods. We sampled from the posterior distribution of this model using the Bayesian
programming language Stan (Stan Development Team 2018), as implemented in R by the
dgo package (Dunham, Caughey, and Warshaw 2019). We ran 4 chains with 2000 iterations
each, with the first half of each chain as warmup, and based inferences on 4000 samples from
the posterior distribution. For further details on the derivation and implementation of the
model, see Sections 8 and 9 of the SI.
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Estimates of Mass Policy Conservatism
By applying the ordinal DGIRT model to each of our four datasets, we obtained four biennial
measures of the average conservatism of men and women aged 16–34, 35–59, and 60+ in each
European country.10 As noted above, our decision to estimate conservatism at the level of
gender × age groups was based on a combination of substantive considerations and data
availability. First, ideological differences between sexes and age groups are theoretically
and politically important. Second, these demographic variables are measured consistently
across surveys, and data on each group’s population share are available for all countries
and periods from Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database). The latter
data are necessary in order to poststratify the group estimates into estimates of national
averages. Other potential interesting variables, such as party identification or education,
were not examined because they either were measured differently across surveys or did not
appear in the Eurostat data, precluding poststratification.11
We begin by examining ideological trends for men and women and for the three age
groups. In line with existing literature (e.g., Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006), we find that on
economic issues, European men, especially young men, have consistently displayed greater
conservatism than their female counterparts (Figure 2, top panels).12 By contrast, on social
and immigration issues (bottom panels), men and women are much more similar. There is
tentative evidence that a gender gap has developed recently on social issues, as well as hints
10Some surveys include 16 and 17 year-olds, but most begin at 18.
11Future users of our method may be interested directly in group-specific rather than national averages, in
which case population data for poststratification would not be necessary. Our online guide and code allows
users to flexibly estimate their own measures of ideology for particular groups, potentially using subsets
of surveys, countries or years where the relevant data are available.
12Figure 2 presents averages across countries, without weighting for country population size. The posterior
probability that men are more conservative than women is greater than 95% in every biennium for 16–34
year-olds, in every biennium except 1983–84 and 1985–86 for 35–59 year-olds, and for every biennium
from 1989–90 onwards for those aged 60+. Note that because estimates of men and women are strongly
correlated within year, the confidence intervals exaggerate the overlap between the posterior distributions
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Figure 2: Trends in mass conservatism by gender, age group, and issue domain. Triangles
and lighter color indicate women; circles and darker color indicate men.
among young men and women that a similar gap may be emerging on immigration. Overall,
however, gender differences are much less pronounced on social and immigration issues than
on economics.
Age divides European publics as well, but in different ways across issue domains.13 On
economic issues, the elderly have been a little more left-wing than the two younger age groups
across most of the period, with the young and middle-aged holding very similar positions.
For social and postmaterial issues, there is a very clear gradient by age. The youngest people
have always been much more socially progressive than the middle-aged, who in turn have
always been much more progressive than the oldest. Similarly, on immigration, the elderly
are more conservative than the two younger age groups across the whole period.
13Our data do not allow us to easily distinguish whether the patterns by age are due to the impact of age
itself or to cohort effects, although the patterns could certainly potentially be explained by generational
replacement. In any case, our ultimate interest is in using these sub-group results to form national totals.
Future research, though, could employ age-period-cohort analysis to address this question.
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The four conservatism measures also differ in their trends over time. After increasing
substantially in the 1980s, mass economic conservatism plateaued, changing little between
1990 and the early 21st century. During and immediately after the 2008–09 economic crisis,
all groups shifted sharply leftward on economics. This change proved only temporary, how-
ever, as economic conservatism reverted to its pre-crisis levels by time our date end in 2016.
In contrast, economic mood has trended in a liberal direction since the mid-1990s among all
age groups. The divergence between absolute conservatism and policy mood on economic
issues could be due to the general retrenchment of the welfare state that occurred across Eu-
rope at this time. This retrenchment could have led to thermostatic responsiveness, whereby
the public reacts to the decline in the size of government by preferring greater government
spending (Soroka and Wlezien 2010).
Social conservatism, on the other hand, declined steadily over the whole thiry-six years of
our data, with the most rapid changes occurring in the 1980s and 1990s for the two younger
age groups. Due to lack of survey data, we can estimate immigration conservatism only since
1989. We find that it too decreased over the period, albeit less than social conservatism did.
Over the past decade, as the immigration crisis in Europe has intensified, this leftward
movement appears to have stalled among most age groups.
To estimate mean conservatism in each country-biennium, we average the estimates for
gender-age strata, weighted in proportion to their composition of national populations at
each point in time. Figures 3 and 4 plot these estimates over time, separately for each
country. Within each panel, countries are ordered according to their average conservatism
across years on the respective measure.
All four figures show a clear north–south ideological divide, but the direction of this
cleavage differs across domains. Southern European countries, most notably Greece, tend
toward the left-wing end of the economic scales (Figure 3) but are closer to the conservative
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Figure 3: Economic conservatism and mood within countries over time. Within each plot,
countries are ordered by their conservatism. Each country’s time series begins in the first
biennium with survey data from that country. Subsequent biennia without survey data are
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Figure 4: Social and immigration conservatism within countries over time. Within each plot,
countries are ordered by their conservatism. Each country’s time series begins in the first
biennium with available survey data. Subsequent biennia without survey data are indicated
with hollow circles.
Denmark and the Netherlands, are the least conservative on social issues and immigration
but are more conservative on economics, particularly mood. Meanwhile, on social issues
and immigration, Eastern European countries are almost all amongst the most conservative
and tend to be similar to Southern European countries. On economic issues, most Eastern
European countries also share greater progressivism with their Southern counterparts, al-
though the Czech Republic (with its highest GDP per capita in Eastern Europe), Estonia,
and Lithuania are markedly more conservative on absolute economic queations.
Figure 5 plots the cross-national relationships between the four conservatism measures.
As the top-left panel shows, social and immigration conservatism have a strongly positive
correlation across countries. Moreover, although their trends have differed somewhat over
time, there is little sign that immigration conservatism is emerging as a distinct dimension.
In 2015–16, for example, the correlation between the two measures (R = .78) was as high as
it has ever been. There is also a robust positive correlation between absolute and relative
conservatism on economic issues (top-right). There is, however, a distinct cluster of Eastern
European nations whose relative conservatism is much lower than their absolute conservatism
would suggest, as well as a few Northern countries (most notably Denmark) whose relative
conservatism is anomalously high. Again, the differences between the two economic measures
probably reflect the different economic policies in place in the two sets of countries.
Although conservatism is highly correlated within the economic and non-economic do-
mains, this is not true across the domains. As the middle panels show, absolute economic
conservatism is essentially unrelated to social and immigration conservatism. Even more
strikingly, relative economic conservatism has a strong negative association with both social
and immigration conservatism. These negative correlations imply that it is not meaningful
to say that certain European publics are conservative across the board. Rather, in con-
temporary Europe, countries that are conservative on relative economic issues are nearly all









































































































































































































































Social vs. Relative Economic
Figure 5: Cross-country correlations between ideological measures. Abbreviations indicate
countries’ average domain-specific conservatism across all biennia. Grey crosses indicate 95%
credible intervals.
mood tend to be right-wing on social and immigration issues (compare Malka, Lelkes, and
Soto 2017). These patterns thus provide empirical justification for measuring conservatism
separately by domain.
Validation
We provide evidence for the validity of our measures of mass policy conservatism with two
kinds of validation: convergent and construct (Adcock and Collier 2001). The purpose of
convergent validation is to show that a new measure is empirically associated with alternative
measures of the same concept. We do this by comparing our conservatism estimates with
responses to individual survey questions and with alternative longitudinal measures of mass
conservatism. We then turn to construct validation, the goal of which is to demonstrate the
empirical association between a new measure of a given concept and an existing measure of
another (distinct) concept believed to be causally related to the concept of interest. We do
this by evaluating the relationships between mass conservatism and government policies in
the same domain. Overall, we find abundant evidence that our measures are valid summaries
of mass policy preferences in a given domain.
Convergent Validation: Comparison with Survey Measures
We begin with convergent validation, demonstrating that our measures are strongly cor-
related with alternative indicators of domain-specific policy preferences. Specifically, we
compare our conservatism estimates with responses to highly ideological survey questions
in each domain. Figure 6 shows the correlation of our estimates on each domain with one
“internal” issue question that is included in the data used to estimate our conservatism
scores and one “external” issue question that does not contribute to our estimates.14 All
14The “external” questions were in all cases not included in our scales because they were asked in only a






















































   
   














































































































   
   













































   
   












































































































































































































Figure 6: Correlations between domain-specific conservatism and individual issue questions.
The first and third columns validate the scale against “internal” issue questions included in
the data used to estimate the corresponding conservatism scores, whereas the second and
fourth columns validate against “external” questions not included in the original data.
of these comparisons show a strong correlation between our ideology estimates and specific
issue questions on each domain (see SI, Section 10 for more details).
To complement the cross-sectional comparisons above, we also evaluate the over-time
dynamics in our conservatism scores. We do so by using Stimson’s (1991) Dyad Ratios
algorithm to estimate aggregate trends in domain-specific conservatism and comparing the
results with our estimates of average conservatism at each point in time. Since we apply
both methods to the same set of data, the primary purpose of this comparison is to show
that our results are not driven by the particular model that we use.15 The Dyad Ratios
algorithm is similar to the DGIRT model in that its goal is to summarize broad ideological
patterns across many issue-specific questions. The most important difference between the
question in future if is repeated across waves.
15We focus this comparison on Western Europe since the large amount of missing data in Eastern European














Economic Economic Mood Immigration Social





















Figure 7: Comparing our domain-specific IRT estimates of mass conservatism in Western
Europe (averaged across countries in each biennium) with analogous estimates calculated
using Stimson’s Dyad Ratios algorithm. Both models use the same data. All series have
been standardized to have zero-mean and unit-variance within country, and are coded so
that higher scores are conservative.
two methods is that Dyad Ratios leverages only longitudinal variation, whereas the DGIRT
model accounts for cross-sectional variation as well. Despite the fact that this distinction
leads the methods to give items different implicit weights, the two sets of estimates are
quite similar. As Figure 7 shows, standardized versions of the two time series generally
track each other and are robustly correlated, especially on social and relative economic
conservatism. This congruence between the two series provides reassurance that our model
faithfully represents longitudinal as well as cross-sectional variation in mass conservatism.
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Construct Validation: Policy Representation and Voting
We now evaluate the relationships between our estimates, and voting and policy outcomes.
Assuming that government policies are indeed influenced by mass policy preferences (see
Powell 2004, 282–91) and that mass ideology predicts voting behavior, evidence for these
theoretical relationships should provides construct validation for our measures. Considering
one policy area for social issues, immigration and economic mood, we find that domain-
specific ideology not only predicts government policies but also does so better than the
two most commonly used measures of mass ideology in the literature to date: left–right
self-placement and median-voter positions. We first report cross-sectional analyses of the
social and immigration domains and then describe a panel analysis of economic policy.16
Finally, we show that absolute economic conservatism is correlated cross-sectionally with
voting in European Parliament elections, although here our measure performs about as well
as left-right placement.
Social Conservatism and Gay Rights Policy
First, we examine policy responsiveness on gay rights issues using the European Region of
the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans & Intersex Association’s “Rainbow Map”
of the liberalism of countries’ gay rights policies. This index is based on over 50 gay rights
policies on topics such as same-sex marriage, non-discrimination laws, and family rights.
As the left panel of Figure 8 shows, across countries there is a strong negative association
between mass conservatism and the expansiveness of gay rights policies (r = −0.80). In other
words, countries where the public has more progressive social views have more progressive
policies. As the right panel shows, this is also true of countries where citizens are more likely
16We focus on cross-sectional analyses of the social and immigration domain due to the lack of panel data
on policy outcomes there. In contrast, on economic policy there are good time-series data as well a broad
array of obvious confounders for cross-sectional comparisons, which is why for that domain we conduct
panel analyses.
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to place themselves on the “left”, but the correlation is about half as strong (r = −0.46)
and not statistically significant.17 This suggests that gay rights policies are more responsive































































































Gay−Rights Policy and Self−Placement
Figure 8: Cross-sectional responsiveness of gay rights policies to mass social conservatism
(left panel) and average self-placement on the left–right scale (right panel).
Immigration Conservatism and Migrant Integration
We next conduct an analogous analysis of immigration policy. To capture ideological varia-
tion in countries’ immigration policy we use the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX),
which measures policies to integrate migrants in all EU Member States as well as many other
countries around the world. The MIPEX is based on 167 policies related to labor market
mobility for migrants, anti-discrimination laws, and many other areas related to migration.
As Figure 9 shows, the correlation between government policy and mass conservatism is
again stronger than its correlation with left–right self-placement (r = −0.60 vs. r = −0.48).
17Data for left–right self-placement come from all Eurobarometer surveys containing the question over the
period. Our country-level measure for each period is the weighted average of all individual responses in
that period, as in past studies.
18We do not compare policy to median-voter scores because our data end in 2004, and even in years before
then are often missing in many countries.
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Thus, like gay rights, policies designed to integrate migrants into society appear to respond












































































































Migrant Integration and Self−Placement
Figure 9: Cross-sectional responsiveness of migrant integration policies to mass immigration
conservatism (left panel) and average self-placement on the left–right scale (right panel).
Economic Mood and Wage Replacement Rates
Our next piece of construct validation analyzes the over-time relationship between the gen-
erosity of welfare policies and publics’ economic mood, taking advantage of the greater avail-
ability of time series data on economic policies. We regress policy on opinion while controlling
for country- and biennium-specific intercepts, thus ruling out persistent country-specific fac-
tors (as well as continent-wide trends) as confounders to the opinion–policy relationship.19
The specific policy indicator we analyze is the gross replacement rate—the percent of wages
replaced by benefits when a worker loses their job—in each biennium.20 A score of 100% on
19We account for within-country dependence by using the wild cluster bootstrap (Esarey and Menger 2018)
to calculate confidence intervals.
20These data were obtained from the OECD. From our twenty-seven countries, data are not available for
Cyprus, Northern Ireland and all Eastern European countries except the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovakia, so we exclude the eight missing countries from this analysis. In addition, data on Italy are
available only through 2005–06 and data on the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia begin only
in 2001.
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this metric implies an extremely generous welfare system that replaces all lost income, and
a score of 0% a very stingy one.
Figure 10 summarizes the results of two sets of analysis.21 For each measure, we con-
ducted two sets of analysis. The first consisted of two-way fixed-effects regression for each
of the three measures in turn, containing all possible observations. The sample sizes and
coverage differ across these regressions, mainly because median-voter scores are often missing
and are only available up to 2004, forcing us to drop almost 70% of country-biennia for that
measure.22 The second analysis also consisted of three regressions, this time with a dataset
consisting only of complete observations, so that the samples were identical in each case.
The figure shows the coefficients on each of the ideology variables: the predicted response
of welfare generosity to a one-unit increase in conservatism (for all three ideology measures,
more positive numbers imply greater conservatism).
Regardless of the specification, our measure of mass economic mood exhibits negative
covariation with the wage replacement rate, as should be expected (bottom panel of Fig-
ure 10): When the public moves to the right in relative economic terms, demanding less
spending, welfare spending becomes less generous. The location of the median-voter, on the
other hand, has a within-country relationship with the replacement rate that is close to zero
(middle panel). Finally, contrary to what would be expected if policy responded to ideolog-
ical identification, an increase in the proportion of citizens’ placing themselves on the right
is positively associated with welfare generosity (top panel). In short, the only variable whose
covariance with economic policies is consistent with responsiveness to citizens’ preferences
is our measure of economic mood. It should be noted that this finding contrasts with the
cross-sectional patterns across countries, where the highest-spending countries are often the
21Table S1 in the SI presents these regression results in tabular form.
22The median voter positions come from an update to the original Kim-Fording dataset produced by De
Neve (2011). They are available only in country-biennia when elections were held, and even in this updated
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● All Available Data
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Predictors of Welfare Generosity
Figure 10: Point estimates and confidence intervals from two-way fixed-effects regressions of
welfare replacement rate on left–right self-placement scores (top row), median-voter location
(middle row) and our estimated measure of economic mood (bottom row), all coded so
that higher values are more conservative. The unit of analysis is the country-biennium.
The effects have been standardized by rescaling all variables to have unit-variance across
the observations used in the estimation. Confidence intervals are calculated using the wild
bootstrap, clustered by country. The available sample size differs for each measure. In each
case, the lighter grey measure uses all available data for the item, and the darker measure
shows results from a balanced dataset of only complete observations for all three items.
most supportive of spending cuts. Only when we add country-specific intercepts to control
for these stable cross-sectional differences is the positive covariation between conservative
economic policymaking and public mood revealed.
Economic Conservatism and European Parliament Elections
Our final piece of construct validation conducts an analogous analysis of absolute economic
conservatism. To capture ideological variation in election outcomes, we use data on the
share of left-wing parties in the 2013 EU Parliamentary Elections. As Figure 11 shows, the
correlation between EU Parliamentary Elections and mass conservatism is moderately strong,
though slightly less so than the correlation between election results and self-placement. Thus,
EU elections appear to respond to citizens’ economic-specific conservatism, but there is no
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EU Parliament Elections and 
    Self−Placement
Figure 11: Cross-sectional responsiveness of EU Elections to mass economic conservatism
(left panel) and average self-placement on the left–right scale (right panel).
Comparison to Proxies for Mass Policy Preferences
We now turn to a direct comparison between our estimates and left–right self-placement and
median-voter positions. As noted above, self-placement scores capture citizens’ identification
with different ideological labels, and median-voter positions are inferred from election results
under assumptions of spatial voting. Moreover, both existing measures presume that mass
policy preferences in Europe vary along a single left–right dimension. It is therefore rea-
sonable to suspect that self-placement and median-voter scores may have weak relationships
with at least one and possibly all four of our measures.
This is in fact what we find. The first thing to note is that despite purportedly measuring
the same concept, left–right self-placement and median-voter scores are almost uncorrelated
with each other (R = .14 across countries; R = −.02 across country-biennia). Both Danes
and Norwegians, for example, tend to place themselves almost identically towards the center-
right end of the ideological scale. But according to median-voter scores, the median Danish






























































































































































































































































































































































Immigration Conservatism vs. Median Voter
Figure 12: Correlations between self-placement scores, median-voter locations, and our mea-
sures of domain-specific conservatism. Each observation is an average for the relevant country
across years. The data end in 2004 for the median voter scores and in 2016 for all other plots
voter in both Italy and Bulgaria is estimated to be very right-wing, but citizens in both
countries place themselves on the left. It appears likely that citizens in different countries
are thinking of different ideological dimensions when describing their ideological positions.
Danes and Norwegians, for example, may be thinking of economic issues given that most
place themselves towards the right. On the other hand, Greeks and Poles also consistently
rate themselves as relatively right-wing, which is in line with their stance on social issues
and immigration but not on economics.
Figure 12 summarizes the bivariate relationships between self-placement and median-
voter scores and our four domain-specific measures. With the exception of relative economic
conservatism (economic mood), all of our measures display a positive cross-national cor-
relation with both self-placement and median voter scores. The correlations are generally
modest, however, only topping 0.5 in the case of median-voter scores’ correlations with immi-
gration and social conservatism. Regressions using our domain-specific measures to explain
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the two proxies for ideology reveal the same patterns. Although there are modest positive
correlations in most cases, the predictive power of our survey-based measures is not great:
collectively, they explain only 17% of the variation in self-placement scores and 12% of the
variation in median voter scores in a multivariate regression.23
The temporal patterns in the measures contrast with each other as well. As others
(e.g., Knutsen 1998; Medina 2015) have observed, over the past decades there has been
little aggregate movement towards the left or right in citizens’ ideological self-placement.
Median-voter scores, by contrast, are in many countries much more variable over time.
As Warwick and Zakharova (2012, 174) note, some of this variation is implausibly large.
Portugal, for example, is estimated to have gone from having one of the most right-wing
electorates in Europe to one of the most left-wing in just twelve years (1987 to 1999).
Similarly, between 1998 and 2001 Denmark moved about a standard deviation to the right
on the median-voter scale. Neither countries’ survey-based ideological positions changed
over those periods in so dramatic a fashion. A likely explanation is that these large shifts
are caused by changes in vote shares that may not reflect voters moving closer to certain
parties ideologically, but rather the effect of economic conditions, shifts in party positions,
or other valence considerations.
In summary, self-placement and median-voter scores, in addition to being essentially
uncorrelated with each other, are at best weakly related to survey-derived summaries of the
public’s domain-specific conservatism. This suggests that the two existing measures are not
especially good proxies for mass policy preferences and in fact measure distinct concepts.
23These inferences are from a least-squares regression with economic, social, and immigration conservatism
as regressors and the country-biennium as the unit of the analysis. The full regression results are shown
in Table S2 in the Supplementary Information.
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Conclusion
We have described the first dynamic, cross-national summaries of mass conservatism derived
from Europeans’ issue preferences. The measures cover 27 countries, 36 years, and four issue
domains: absolute economic, relative economic, social, and immigration. We have validated
our measures against individual issue questions, time series of domain-specific policy mood,
and policies themselves, finding robust evidence of their validity.
Our measures indicate that since the 1980s, European publics have moved markedly left-
ward on social issues and modestly so on immigration. Europeans’ support for conservative
revisions to existing economic policies declined as well, even as their absolute economic con-
servatism slightly increased. On economics, men have consistently taken more conservative
positions than women, but only recently has any sign of an analogous gender gap emerged on
social and immigration issues. Social and immigration conservatism increases strongly with
age, but on economics, age matters little for absolute conservatism and if anything is asso-
ciated with lower values of relative conservatism. All four measures exhibit a clear regional
divide across countries. Compared to Southern and Eastern Europeans, Northern Euro-
peans tend to be more progressive on social and immigration issues but more conservative
on economics.
The negative relationship between between economic conservatism and social and im-
migration conservatism indicates that cross-national variation in European mass ideology
cannot be captured with a single left–right dimension, at least as those labels are commonly
understood. Thus, in many contexts our domain-specific measures of policy conservatism
may be preferrable to unidimensional measures such as self-placement and median-voter.
While the latter remain valuable as measures of ideological identification and electoral pref-
erences, applied scholars should consider whether they capture the construct of theoretical
interest.
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Given the central place that citizens’ policy preferences play in normative and positive
theories of politics, the scope of potential applications of our measures is vast. In addition
to facilitating descriptive inferences about ideological patterns in the mass public, they can
also be used to examine governments’ responsiveness to citizens’ preferences, as we have
shown. These analyses could of course be extended to examine the institutional and contex-
tual moderators of policy representation. Additional topics include the role that mass policy
preferences play in electoral outcomes and these preferences’ responsiveness to shifting eco-
nomic and social conditions. We hope and expect that other researchers use our estimates to
explore these and other important questions. To facilitate this, we have made our estimates
available to the public and will continue to update them as more survey data is released.
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